Physics 5 / History 177 Fall1997/ Spring 1998
The Nuclear Age: Its Physics and History
Profs. Gary R. Goldstein and Martin J. Sherwin
Strategic Defense Initiative and ABM
How to defend against nuclear weapons - the Triad, cruise missiles,
tactical weapons and sabotage.
I. ABM and SALT I
- Nuclear missile defense against incoming RV's
- Defending silos to preserve retaliatory ability (Safeguard)
- Defending population centers (Galosh)
- Countermeasures
- Decoys to confuse tracking and targetting
- Proliferating to overcome defense (cost?)
- Treaty forbade new development and testing in space - limited
deployment to 2/country
- Costly
- Ineffective for cities since 100% coverage needed
- System requirements
- Detection of launches via satellite long range radar or early warning
system
- Tracking via shorter range satellite based radar or ground based
radars that look at horizon
- Projecting trajectories with computers on-line
- Coordinating ABM launches and targetting with more short range radar
- Medium and short range nuclear missiles (nuclear for explosion within
2 or 3 Km to "kill" target with gamma's)
II. SDI or Star Wars (over $40 billion so far)
- System requirements are the same, but technology advanced "to meet
the challenge"
- microelectronics and third generation nuclear weapons
- satellite basing and high power directed energy weapons in
development - booster phase interception
- lasers
- kinetic kill weapons
- fast burn solid fuel interceptors
- Problems - see transparencies
- Proliferation
- Decoys
- Fast burn boosters
- Untested software
- Cost of placing hardware in orbit (heavy duty rockets or atomic
powered rockets - atmospheric test ban?)
- Complexity
- EMP vulnerability
- Space mines, debris, ASAT
- Destabilizing
- First Strike threat
- "Enhanced deterrence"
- No protection against short range or tactical weapons, cruise
missiles or sabotage
III. G[lobal] P[rotection] A[gainst] L[imited] S[trikes]
- Limited goals still require full earth coverage by KEW's or
"Brilliant pebbles" (with relative computer autonomy) and two
layered
- Expensive to deploy on satellites - up to 5000
- Complexity not an order of magnitude less
- ASAT, space mines, still problems
- Detection and acquisition as extensive as old SDI
- Problems
- Short range attacks on neighboring countries escape detection
- Autonomy leads to fratricide
- Encourages rapid deployment and preemptive strikes
- EMP
- Sabotage
- Pressure triggers of enemy missiles
IV. A laser calculation - how energetic and how many lasers would
need
to be in orbit to have a chance of stopping a full contingent of MIRVed
ICBMs?
- ~20KJ/cm2 to fracture ICBM booster
- Diffraction limited lasers (100 MW for HF laser, enormous power for
N.Bomb)
- Encounter time makes up for power shortfall, but limits effectiveness
of any single laser
- t(accessable)/t(encounter) = no. of shots for 1 laser
- no.of targets/no. of shots per laser = no. of lasers
- 1/5% coverage factor -> no. of laser platforms in orbit
V. New BMD (92) or NMD (94), THAAD and Navy Wide Area Defense
(97-...)
- Large scale - strategic capable
- Theater weapons - the myth of the Patriot Missile
- "Demarcation" negotiations (Sep.97) and reactivation of ABM
Treaty
- TMD vs. Strategic MD
- 6 US systems, 4 true Theater Defenses
- THAAD and Navy Area Wide Defense (~2000)
- 2.6 Km/s and 4.5 Km/s for interceptors
- Intercept targets of 5 Km/s (intermediate) or 7 Km/s (Long range)
- Large "footprint" (Testing continues at Kwajalein Test Range
Facility)
- SBIS-Low (sattelite based infrared sensors in low
orbit) or "brilliant eyes" - violation of ABM treaty by being
nationwide (not area) detection and tracking system
- NMD (Clinton's 3+3 plan) 20 interceptors in 2000 and 100 in 2003 -
violation by being national defense rather than area defense
- START II in jeopardy (ABM violations and NATO expansion) in
Russia