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3. Carbon Offset Quality Arguably the most important aspect of an offset company is the quality of its project portfolio. High quality carbon offsets must clearly demonstrate additionality, avoid double counting, have a realistically calculated baseline and emissions reduction projection, account for leakage and be permanent. In the following sections we explore each of these issues.
3.1 Additionality (this
section was rewritten for revision 1.2) Although we agree that policies to avert climate change should be implemented swiftly, we disagree that additionality can be treated lightly. If I buy carbon offsets, I make the implicit claim that I forgo reducing my own emissions (i.e. I still fly) but in exchange I pay someone to reduce their emission in my stead. If I buy carbon offsets to “neutralize” the emissions I caused during air travel from someone who would have reduced their emissions anyway, regardless of my payment, I, in effect, have not only wasted my money, but I also have not neutralized my emissions. It is not necessary that the project is happening solely because of the carbon credits it produces but the anticipated benefits of the carbon offsets have to be a decisive factor for pursuing the project. What makes additionality so difficult an issue is not its theoretical definition, but its application in practice. In fact, there is no way to determine with absolute certainty if a project is additional or not. Instead, many different additionality tests and eligibility criteria have been developed to maximize the accuracy of additionality testing . The following is a short selection of additionality tests that are commonly used:
It is important to point out that there is no single test for additionality. Which test is best suited to validate additionality depends on the type of project. An additionality test for one type of project (e.g., a simple regulatory test for methane flaring, where there is no reason to do the project if not required by law) might not be sufficient for other kinds of projects (e.g., energy efficiency, where there could be plenty of reasons for doing a project besides complying with regulations). Also, additionality tests are always to some extent subjective, because the assumptions that underlie even the strictest additionality test are determined by the objectives that the additionality test is trying to fulfill. These objectives cannot be scientifically determined or tested, because they are not technical but political in nature and must therefore be discussed and standardized by policy makers . To illustrate this, here a simplified example: to apply a regulatory test on an energy-efficiency project, a third party verifying company determines the parameters for additionality based on their analysis of the situation. In some cases, an improvement of 10% over the statutory requirements may be considered additional, but in other cases, where, for example, the policy is considered very minimal (e.g. a building code with minimal energy-efficiency requirements), the project would need to exceed the minimum standards by at least 50%. The discussion about additionality shows one of the weaknesses of project-based emissions reductions policies. Cap-and-trade systems, or purely regulatory action such as efficiency standards and carbon taxes, avoid the issue of additionality altogether. This is one reason we strongly advocate robust regulatory action and see value in the voluntary emissions trade market only insofar as it can spur innovation and carbon reductions even in a hostile political environment. It is never possible to establish with certainty what would have happened in the absence of a particular project, and clearly there is potential for abuse. For example, there are strong financial incentives for the seller (project financier and implementer) as well as the offset buyer to overestimate the “business-as-usual” baselines and thus artificially inflate emission credits for improved performance. There is clearly a need for strict monitoring and third-party verification of carbon projects. Although the risks of “cheating” are real and substantial, it is also important to recognize that additionality rules that are too stringent can hamper project implementation. The debate over additionality
is especially fierce surrounding the issue of converting Renewable
Energy Credits (RECs) to carbon offset credits. More
details on this discussion can be found in section
3.3. 3.2
Double Counting (last edited for revision 1.3) Some of these double
counting issues are easily addressed: Other double counting issues are more difficult to address: For example, if a US citizen were to buy offsets that are then are invested in a wind farm project in Canada, he will take credit for these emissions reductions. But Canada will also count the resulting reduction in carbon emissions from the new wind farm toward their emission reductions goals that they are required to meet as signatories of the Kyoto protocol. This means, not only are the emissions double counted but the wind farm has effectively replaced another set of emissions reduction measures that Canada would have had to take in order to meet its Kyoto requirements. Viewed this way, it can be argued that the wind farm does not have any net carbon benefits. On the other hand, a valid counter argument can be made that such a wind farm project would stimulate the renewable energy industry in Canada and might therefore encourage further renewable energy projects and a move towards a low carbon economy. It can also be argued that because of the uncertain future of the Kyoto agreement and because international environmental agreements are notorious for their unenforceability, it is unclear how seriously countries take their treaty obligations. In other words, in our hypothetical answer, Canada might not take any actions to reduce their carbon emissions and withdraw their commitment to Kyoto. In this case, the wind farm would be additional and paradoxically the double counting issues would be less serious. The same would hold true if the wind farm was build in the US, which has not ratified the Kyoto agreement. These national double counting problems could be addressed if Annex 1 countries with emissions reduction obligations would retire AAU credits for all the VERs that are created through the voluntary market. We are unaware of any country that currently has such regulation in place. Double counting issues also apply on a more local level: if a region, state, county or city has enacted a emissions reduction target – even if it is just a voluntary one – any emissions that are created in that area but then sold as VERs in the voluntary market must not also be counted in that jurisdiction’s emissions inventory. Although double counting on a national level is currently not a problem in the US, but more localized double counting problems remain an issue. For example, the Climate Trust buys offsets from the City of Portland for two of their building energy efficiency programs. Yet, in 1993, the city of Portland became the first U.S. city to adopt a strategy to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). Their Local Action Plan on Global Warming calls for a reduction of carbon dioxide emissions to 10 percent below 1990 levels by 2010. According to their webpage:
The carbon offsets that the Climate Trust buys from the City of Portland are also counted in the cities’ greenhouse gas inventory. The Climate Trust responded to our concern:
Additional legislation is needed to avoid double counting of voluntary offsets generated in Annex I countries (see section 5) and in areas that have sub-national emissions reductions obligations or goals (e.g. California or RGGI). An international registry for VERs (similar to that which exists for CERs created by CDM projects) is needed to minimize fraudulent double counting. 3.3
Types of Carbon Credits
(last edited for revision 1.3) Yet the administrative burden for CDM projects is larger than in a more informal market. Projects that do not fall under the Kyoto mechanisms are more difficult to verify, since there are no clear guidelines and third party certification is done at the discretion of the offset company. That means that the quality of Verified Emissions Reductions (VERs) can vary greatly. This makes it harder for the consumer to be sure her emissions are truly offset by the VERs she buys. Sometimes projects in developing countries are not registered as CDM projects because they are too small. myclimate estimates that a carbon offset project must reduce at least 5,000 metric tons of CO2 per year in order justify the CDM transaction costs . Such projects can still adhere to high standards, for example they can be implemented using the Gold Standard’s new standards for VER generating projects — projects that are outside of the Kyoto Protocol. Table 1: International Carbon Trading and Project Mechanism
Renewable
Energy Credits (RECs) (last edited for revision 1.2) RECs are frequently turned into carbon credits by multiplying them by a factor that accounts for the avoided CO2 emissions. In theory, it does not matter if RECs are sold as RECs or as carbon credits as long as they are not double counted and are additional. Yet in practice assuring additionality is very difficult. Voluntary market RECs generally do not have to adhere to the same strict additionality standards as carbon offsets (VERs.) Green-e certified RECs, for example, have to come from renewable energy plants that were built after 1997 and cannot be counted towards Renewable Portfolio Standards or any other legal requirements. Although these two requirements are important, they do not fully address additionality. Because of the economic benefits of many renewable energy projects, such as wind farms, it is especially difficult to determine additionality with RECs. Some companies clearly state that their RECs have to comply with the same additionality criteria as carbon offsets (VERs.) In this case, RECs are a credible alternative to VERs. Yet most companies do not make this distinction. This is not to say that none of the available RECs are additional. Some developers explicitly state that the revenue from RECs played a decisive role making the project viable:
Yet the issue remains
that there is currently no standard and verification available that ensures
RECs are additional. Forward
Purchasing of Offsets (FPO) / Future offsets (5)
(last edited for revision 1.3) FPO does not guarantee additionality, but most additional projects need to secure upfront offset funding. It is much easier to implement financially additional projects if customers can be found who are willing to pay upfront than if the project needs to secure funding from lenders with the expectation that the debt will be paid off later by customers purchasing carbon reductions. (Conversely, non-additional projects by definition do not depend on any offset funding - so they can afford to go forward and wait for customers to pay for their "reductions" in the future.) Therefore, forward purchasing can be an incentive for additional projects, in other words, FPO does not guarantee additionality, but on balance will lead to more additional projects than a "pay-as-you-go" approach. Additionality needs to be substantiated regardless of whether one is purchasing forward credits or current year credits it's central to the claim about offsetting emissions. A distinction needs to be made between contracts of forward purchases and contracts of forward crediting. With forward purchases, the buyer invests the money upfront but does not get the credits until they are actually produced. This is how most CDM projects are financed. Yet in the voluntary market, offset purchasers are often unwilling to make long-term commitments, especially in the context of offsetting air travel, where purchasers offset one flight at a time, or a year of flying at a time. With forward crediting, the buyer pays and also gets the offsets credited upfront, despite the fact that they will only be produced in the future.
Clearly, forward crediting carries the risk of claiming credits as real that may or may not happen in the future. Being conservative when calculating the estimated offsets and discounting them to allow for underperformance are legitimate tools to reduce the risk of these forward crediting mechanisms. Nevertheless, they can be a risky proposition and consumers should be encouraged to opt for companies that fully disclose both the risks and how those risks are mitigated by discounting. Bundled
offsets Bundling offsets is problematic if low quality emissions reductions are mixed into the portfolio. For example, the Chicago Climate Exchange offers bundled offsets that include project based emissions as well as emissions reductions achieved by member corporations that went above their emissions reductions target. These emissions reductions, although laudable, are not the same as offset reductions created through offset projects alone. They raise issues of overabundancy, double counting, and transparency. This is especially true since CCX’s standards and verifications procedures are proprietary. Because the voluntary carbon market is so young, we recommend consumers act as conservatively as possible and buy carbon offsets with highest standards of certification and verification, even if those currently carry higher transaction costs. 3.4
Standards and Verification (last edited for revision 1.3) Standards alone cannot ensure the quality of a project. It is only through the validation and verification of these standards that projects can reliably be evaluated. Verification consists of the periodic monitoring and review of ongoing projects in addition to an evaluation after the project period has ended. The monitoring ensures that the project is meeting goals and operating properly. For example, if a project involves installing stoves, monitoring allows for assurance that the stoves are working and are being used. End-of-project verification ensures that the carbon emissions have been reduced by the amount intended. It is particularly important to have a third party involved at this point as there is an obvious incentive for project financers and offset buyers to see that projects have met their goals. Independent verification is crucial for the credibility of emission reduction projects. Below is a description of the most frequently used standards and verification procedures. Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) As mentioned earlier, the CDM is part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). As the largest regulatory project-based mechanism, the CDM offers the public or private sector in developed nations the opportunity to purchase carbon credits from offset projects in developing nations. CDM is involved in setting standards and verifying projects. Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) are verified and certified by authorized third parties (Designated Operational Entities.) CDM standards are stringent and robust yet have high transaction costs so that usually only large projects are registered. CDM requires strict additionality for certification of carbon offset projects. For validation and verification procedures, see footnote (4). Gold
Standard and Voluntary Gold Standard The Gold Standard was developed by a network of non-government organizations, which sets higher standards than the CDM. It is endorsed by 42 NGOs worldwide. Gold Standard projects include renewable energy or energy efficiency technologies. (No sequestration projects are accepted). The Gold Standard requires strict additionality for certification of the carbon offset projects. For a project to be selected, these standards must be met and are checked by a UNFCCC-accredited organization. Monitoring and verification is also done by these organizations to ensure the benefits are realized. Gold
Standard projects take into account differing environmental, social and
economical factors to maximize the secondary benefits and to minimize
the negative impacts of a project. It actively encourages local participation
in project design, and seeks to maximize sustainable development benefits.
There are currently eight projects registered as Gold Standard projects. Information about them can be accessed at: www.cdmgoldstandard.org/projects.php Voluntary
Gold Standard The Gold Standard is the most rigorous standard available to date. Although adhering to the Gold Standard incurs higher transaction costs and can therefore lead to higher prices for consumers, we strongly recommend purchasing offsets that follow these strict guidelines. Voluntary
Carbon Standard (last
edited for revision 1.3) The Climate Group (TCG), the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) and the World Economic Forum Global Greenhouse Register (WEF) jointly develop the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS). Version 1 of the Standard was published in 2006. The goal of the VCS is to provide “a certification tool that is designed to give users confidence that voluntary project-based GHG emission reductions are real, measurable, permanent, additional and independently verified” (The Climate Group) Carbon offsets that are certified and verified through the VCS are called Voluntary Carbon Units (VCUs). VCUs are fungible, tradable and registered: VCS established an international registry for its VCUs which is sited at the Bank of New York. The Voluntary Carbon
Standard Version 2 is currently being developed. A draft of the VCS version
2 can be downloaded at http://theclimategroup.org/assets/Voluntary_Carbon_Standard_Version_2_final.pdf Chicago
Climate Exchange (CCX) (last edited for revision 1.2) The Chicago Climate Exchange is a voluntary cap-and-trade emission trading system. CCX operates mainly in the US but also has members and affiliates in Canada and Mexico. Members commit to reduce their emissions by a certain amount each year, measured against their original baseline. Companies that achieve reductions that go above the commitment can sell these emissions reductions as CCX’s commodities called Carbon Financial Investments (CFIs.) Companies can also invest in external carbon projects which are implemented in the US, Canada, Mexico and Brazil. These projects involve mostly methane capture and carbon sequestration though forestry and no-till agriculture. The offset from these projects are also tradable as CFIs. The CCX certification and verification process is proprietary. It is therefore difficult to evaluate the quality of CCX’s carbon offsets. Several NGOs have criticized the CCX for its loopholes, lack of clearly defined additionality criteria and a general lack of transparency (Dale, 2006). In addition, many of the member companies of CCX have over-complied with their commitments. This has led to an overabundancy of CFIs. In a cap-and-trade system, it is most important that the cap is set at a high enough level so the system produces meaningful reductions that go beyond business-as-usual. Additionality is not of concern because it is the cap on the emissions that helps achieve real reductions. To give an example: if the cap on a hypothetical cap-and-trade system is 1000 tons of CO2 and I buy 100 tons and retire them, I have in effect created a scarcity of available credits. That means the price of the still available credits will likely go up and companies will have to work harder to create additional credits. If, on the other hand, there is an overabundancy of credits and I buy some of those credits, I have in effect just reduced some of the excess credits that are available. CCX has certainly
demonstrated a very innovative and valuable approach to carbon trading.
Yet, because of a lack of transparency, the current overabundancy of CFIs,
and to a lesser degree because of their focus on bio-sequestration
in their external offset projects, we advocate that consumers minimize
purchasing voluntary offsets that were generated through CCX. Green-e Green-e is run by the Center for Resource Solutions (CRS), a US-based non-profit company that measures and verifies a range of renewable energy projects. Green-e both sets standards for US renewable energy projects and verifies the projects. Green-e certified Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) have to be generated by power plants that were built after 1997 and they cannot be used to also meet regulatory portfolio standards. RECs can be sold and traded independent of the electricity produced both in mandatory and in voluntary markets. As mentioned earlier, RECs do not have to adhere to the same strict additionality standards as carbon offsets. Because of the economic benefits of many renewable energy projects, such as wind farms, it is especially difficult to determine additionality with RECs. CRS is currently working on developing new, stricter standards for RECs that are converted to carbon offsets. We strongly support efforts to develop clear, transparent and strict rules for selling RECs into the voluntary carbon market. Given how important renewable energy production will be in guiding us towards a low-carbon future, we support the financing of renewable energy projects though voluntary carbon offset companies, as long as the project are of high quality, fulfill strict additionality standards and are not double counted. CRS is currently (as of January 2007) working on developing new, stricter standards for RECs that are converted to carbon offsets (3). We strongly support efforts to develop clear, transparent and strict rules for selling RECs into the voluntary carbon market. Given how important renewable energy production will be in guiding us towards a low-carbon future, we support the financing of renewable energy projects though voluntary carbon offset companies, as long as the project are of high quality, fulfill strict additionality standards and are not double counted. 1 Allowances are the unit of compliance that are traded in cap and trade programs. 2 Credits (Offsets) are emission reductions that an emitter has achieved in excess of any required reductions. The excess amount is the credit and can be sold on the market. 3 The draft version of these guidelines are available here. Stakeholder comments accepted until January 31st, 2007. The comment form is available here. 4 A Designated Operational Entity (DOE) is a company accredited by the CDM Executive Boards that checks whether projects are fulfilling CDM criteria. Each CDM project must be validated and verified. Validation is done once before initial project approval. Verification is done periodically after the project has been approved or registered. Validation The DOE then issues a validation report, and requests registration of the project though the CDM Executive Board Verification 5 The phrase “future offset” was replaced with “forward purchases of offsets (FPO)” in revision 1.3 of this paper. This is to distinguish between forward purchasing and forward crediting. As explained in this chapter, we do recommend forward purchasing but are wary of forward crediting. |
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